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Paul Vehmeyer's comments on the UNTAC
period
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From
e-mail correspondence with Paul in July / August 2006 |
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Paul was former
First Secretary Netherlands Embassy - Bangkok (1992-1992) and Deputy
Permanent Representative to ESCAP. He was also former Second Secretary to
the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to OECD, Paris (1990-1992).
Whilst in
Bangkok for the whole period 1992-1996 he was charged with "Cambodia" and
visited from the beginning the UNTAC / UNDP-co-chaired monthly meetings of
the SDCOC (State Development Council of Cambodia) held in Phnom Penh. |
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Paul offered
more detail on the UNTAC period, starting with this statement:
"The
various parties concerned, Hun Sen's SOC (State of Cambodia), the Royalists
(Norodom Sinahouk and his son Ranariddh's later Funcinpec) as well as the
KPNLF (roughly speaking an amalgam of liberal Buddhists and heritage of old
Lon Nol military man) and of course the Khmer Rouge (PDK's negotiator Khieu
Sampan), undersigned the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991.
France
as the host country of the talks and the United Nations had a great part in
it, and a nearly two-year UN-assisted transitional period for Cambodia took
off. By the time of August 1992 UNTAC supported the peace plan with 22.000
troops.
As
many as 16 nations were implementing the four main goals. Those included
- the securing of peace and demilitarisation in the whole
of Cambodia
- the cantonment and disarming of military troops
- the resettlement of almost 400,000 Cambodian refugees
and displaced persons
- the organisation of free and fair elections
Although
the cooperation of all interior parties concerned was delicate and had at
times to be called less than nominal in May 1993 elections were held. These
were a big success for the Cambodians and the UN." |
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Mick
and Paul then engaged in an e-mail Q&A. |
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Question
from Mick: didn't the sheer amount of money spent by UNTAC and associated
“players” have a rather negative effect on inflation and the economy? |
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Answer
from Paul Vehmeyer:"The answer is affirmative.
The Cambodian economy wasn't ready for such a spending spree. The level of
supply of goods and services couldn't meet the sudden demand caused by UNTAC
and the influx of NGO's, investors, embassies, tourists etc. Venturers who
wanted to profit or more likely profiteer from short-term investments
("earning the quick buck") popped-up everywhere. Riels were totally
inadequate as currency. I remember buying once a loaf of brown bread in a
shop close to the central market in Phnom Penh (it must have been in
September 1992) and paying with a US 2-dollar note. They gave me about a
shoebox of Riels back ...
Anyway taking sufficient monetary and budgetary
measures with lack of policy instruments was pretty hopeless. To control the
destabilising factors on the overall economy in 1992 early 1993 was
illusory. Of course there were more side-effects to the realisation of the
principal goals from the peace accords. (For instance the steep increase in
HIV/AIDS cases).
After some lapse of time UNTAC (Roger Lawrence) was
able to stabilize the economy. Primarily because the total number of troops
employed fell off sharply. Also investors became more concerned with
over-all security. This was the time of train (PP-Battambang) hold-ups and
hostage takings throughout the country, even in "safe" areas, who ended
fatally." |
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Question
from Mick: despite the election result, wasn't power shared due to pressure
on the UN from Hun Sen? |
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Answer
from Paul Vehmeyer:"The answer to this is
considerably complex. Your assumption that the exertion of the SOC/HunSen's
Cambodian Peoples Party on the UN neutralised the election result is an
oversimplification I am afraid. Funcinpec wasn't too well organised to begin
with. Remember the various crises around the capable member of SNC (Supreme
National Council) and
minister of Finance Sam Rainsy as well as the inner circle upheavals. Within
the provinces executive power was in fairly all the provinces strongly in
hands of SOC-cadres. One could observe that Hun Sen was certainly playing hard-ball there.
Bear in mind please that Cambodia till that time for 17
years had been a one party state and had been thoroughly militarised. So the
risk of having a Funcinpec-lead coalition government in the city of Phnom
Penh and SNC-chieftains elsewhere was at certain times in the summer of 1993
very, very real. Hun Sen might have done his country a big service at the
time with all his canvassing and leg-pulling in CPP's strongholds.
At least HRH Norodom Sihanouk, head of state and king
at the time held that view. So Cambodia ended-up with a co-chairing prime
ministership. Which was in March 1994 in Tokio at ICORC II (International
Consortium on the Reconstruction of Cambodia; Conference to mobilise large
sums of assistance) quite a mummery. I remember US Secretary of State Warren
Christopher and USA's Ambassador to Japan, Walter Mondale being there and
putting-up a forceful show of interest in the democratic developments of
Cambodia... Needless to say that Ranariddh couldn't sustain power."
Note: In the UNTAC-period the Cambodian governmental counterpart was
invested within this SNC. It was the transitional authority in which
throughout this time the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia was
enshrined until the free and fair elections had produced a new legitimate
national Administration. SOC ("State of Cambodia") as the (internationally
contested; UN refused them the seat in the General Assembly since 1982)
incumbent of local power had 5 seats. The Royalist had 2 (being Funcinpec).
The BLDP/KPNLF had also 2. And the Khmer Rouge possessed 2 as well. The SNC
was presided over by the king. The Khmer Rouge have hardly showed up if they
ever came at all. I remember that once Khieu Samphan, their delegate for
"external relations", trying to attend a meeting at Wat Phnom was attacked
by 'the mob'. That photograph went all over the world." |
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The
Cambodian tragedy - why Anlong
Veng?
The
Anlong Veng project - what is
it?
Anlong
Veng diary
- March 2000
Siem
Reap diary - June 2000
Phnom
Penh diary - November 2000
Trapang
Prasat diary - June 2001
Angkor
Chum diary - June 2001
Phnom
Penh & Tuol Sleng - March 2002
Trapang
Prasat diary - April 2002
Angkor
Chum diary - April 2002
Cambodia
Diary - March 2003
3
Year Project Report - May 2003
Anlong
Veng, Preah Vihear & Kulen District - February 2004
Anlong
Veng, Trapang Prasat & Preah Vihear
- March 2009
Mary
Sarath's Journal - Anlong Veng to Preah Vihear
- March 2009
Matt
Warren's Times Educational Article
-
January 2002
Gaye
Miller's story - a container from Melbourne 1
- September 2003
Gaye
Miller's story - a container from Melbourne 2
- October 2003
Anne-Lise
Aakervik's project - children taking photographs - February 2004
Gaye
Miller's story continued 1 - April/May 2005
Gaye
Miller's story continued 2 - April/May 2005
Slide
Presentation to King Edward's School, Bath
- November 2002
Books
on Cambodia
'net
links Cambodia
Angkor
photos - March 2000
Anlong
Veng photos - March 2000
Trapang
Prasat photos - March 2000
Trapang
Prasat photos - November 2000
Angkor
photos - June 2001
Trapang
Prasat photos - June 2001
Angkor
Chum photos - June 2001
Phnom
Penh photos - March 2002
Tuol
Sleng (S-21) photos - March 2002
Trapang
Prasat photos - April 2002
Angkor
Chum photos - April 2002
Anlong
Veng & Trapang Prasat photos - March 3 2003
Angkor
Chum & Varin photos - March 4 2003
Svay
Leu photos - March 5 2003
Siem
Reap / Artisans d'Angkor - February 20 2004
Anlong
Veng & Trapang Prasat
- February 21 2004
Dangrek
Mountains & Preah Vihear
Temple - February
22 2004
Kulen
District & Koh Ker Temple - February 23 2004
Anlong
Veng, Trapang Prasat & Preah Vihear
- March 2009
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